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A Woman in Stone or in the Heart of Man?
Navigating Between Naturalism and Idealism in the Spirit of Veritatis Splendor1
Michelle Schumacher

“What good is the poet in barren times?” (Friedrich Hölderlin)2
In an encyclical whose purpose is “to reflect on the whole of the church’s moral
teaching, with the precise goal of recalling certain fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine
which, in the present circumstances, risk being distorted or denied,”3 one would expect—in
keeping with tradition—that emphasis would be upon the “good [that] is to be done and
pursued and [the] evil [that is] to be avoid.”4 What is particularly surprising in the approach of
Pope John Paul II, then, is his focus upon truth and beauty, as the very name of the encyclical
implies: Veritatis Splendor.5
“Why is the ‘splendour of truth’ so important?” John Paul II asks within the context of
his 1994 Letter to Families.
First of all, by way of contrast: the development of contemporary civilization is linked
to a scientific and technological progress which is often achieved in a one-sided way, and thus
appears purely positivistic. Postivisim, as we know, results in agnosticism in theory and
utilitarianism in practice and in ethics. In our own day, history is in a way repeating itself.
Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use, a civilization of “things” and not of
“persons”, a civilization in which persons are use in the same way as things are used. In the
context of a civilization of use, woman can become an object for man, children a hindrance to
parents, the family an institution obstructing the freedom of its members.6
Or, as the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar prophetically describes this
utilitarian world, it is “a world without women, without children, without reverence for the
form of love in poverty and humility, a world in which everything is viewed solely in terms of
power or profit-margin, in which everything that is disinterested and gratuitous and useless is
despised, persecuted, and wiped out, and even art is forced to wear the mask and the features
of technique.”7
What Balthasar herein recognizes as the consequence of the separation of nature and
grace (or of divine and human causality), at least within the confines of much of
contemporary thought, might also be formulated in terms of the typically modern conflict
1

Also published in Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2013): 1249–86.
“… wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit” (From “Brot und Wein”)
3
John Paul II, Encyclical letter on “the Splendor of Truth,” Veritatis Splendor (August 6, 1993), no. 4.
4
St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
5
See Veritatis Splendor, no. 51, where John Paul II teaches that “to perfect himself in his specific order,” the
human person must not only “do good and avoid evil,” but he must also “seek truth, practice good and
contemplate beauty.”
6
John Paul II, Gratissimam Sane (2 February, 1994), no. 13.
7
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, translated by David C. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 2004), 142.
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between human freedom and natural necessity.8 Such is also the origin of the modern idea of
selfhood, resulting, as Louis Dupré observes, “either in a naturalist or in an idealist
conception of the person.”9
Both sides […] found it hard to preserve genuine otherness. A self-reduced to a
meaning-giving function—a mere subject—loses its personal identity and, as a result, is no
longer able to recognize the identity of the other. […] Likewise, if the self is merely a
substance [in a Cartesian sense] albeit it a distinct one, it becomes absorbed within an
objective totality that admits no real otherness.10
Hence, as Kenneth Schmitz summaries, otherness is understood either “in terms of
conflict (dialectics) or equivocity (deconstruction).”11 In the second sense, “The lonely man of
today meets in the ‘thou’ only himself; he is,” Balthasar observes, “more narcissistic than ever
before in the history of mankind.”12
A way beyond this impasse—that of “the sharp subject-object division characteristic
of modern philosophical anthropology”—is, Dupré suggests, recourse to the ideas of beauty
and harmony: ideas which “do not allow themselves to be explained in either of those terms,
even though aesthetic theories kept hesitating between the two, leaning at first more to the
objective and later to the subjective side.”13 As for Blessed John Paul II, he follows the
example of Christ in his dialogue with the rich young man (cf. Mt 19:16) by making “an
appeal to the absolute good which attracts us and beckons us” as the “echo of a call from God,
who is the origin and goal of man’s life.”14 As such, it is also an appeal to human freedom,
insofar as it is understood—in the classic (pre-modern) sense—as “rooted in the soul’s
spontaneous inclinations to the true and the good,”15 whence also his appeal to beauty: the
shining forth (splendour) of the truth so that it might be savoured by the senses of sight and
sound.16
In the profound words of Hans Urs von Balthasar,

8

This modern tension between nature and freedom is fittingly portrayed by Michael Allen Gillespie in terms of
the conflict between Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes, whom Gillespie presents as “prototypical modern
thinkers” (The Theological Origins of Modernity [Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2008], 262).
9

Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture (New Haven / London:
Yale University Press, 2004), 76-77.
10
Ibid., 76. See also idem, The Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 118-19. “The conceptual apparatus of modern thought,
including much theology,” Dupré argues elsewhere, “has come to rest on the assumption that the subject-object
opposition must be recognized as an ultimate” (idem, Metaphysics and Culture, The Aquinas Lecture, 1994
[Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994], 57).
11
Kenneth Schmitz, “Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the Concrete,” The Thomist 61, no. 3 (1997),
339-71, here 361.
12
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The God Question and Modern Man, with foreword by John Macquarrie, translated
by Hilda Graef (New York: Seabury Press, 1967), 106.
13
Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, 76.
14
Veritatis Splendor, no. 7.
15
Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, translated by Mary Thomas Noble from the third edition
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 333. “For St. Thomas,” Pinckaers explains,
“the natural inclinations to goodness, happiness, being and truth were the very source of freedom. They formed
the will and intellect, whose union produced free will.” (ibid., 245).
16
See, for example, ST I, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 1.
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“The form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the delight that it arouses in us
is founded upon the fact that, in it, the truth and goodness of the depths of reality itself are
manifested and bestowed. […] The appearance of the form, as revelation of the depths, is an
indissoluble union of two things. It is the real presence of the depths, of the whole of reality,
and it is a real pointing beyond itself to these depths. […] We “behold” the form; but, if we
really behold it, it is not as a detached form, rather in its unit with the depths that make their
appearance in it. We see form as the splendour, as the glory of Being. We are “enraptured” by
our contemplation of these depths and are “transported” to them.”17
What is thus proposed for our appropriation by Veritatis Splendor is a profoundly
realist (or creational) perspective: one which affirms the goodness—and thus also the
beauty—of things in themselves, and not simply from the perspective of the human subject, as
goes the expression: beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. This, of course, is also a
metaphysical perspective—one that literally goes surpasses the physical dimension—but one
which nonetheless implies that truth might be perceived—even touched and heard—by the
knowing subject, whence also John Paul II’s recourse at times to phenomenology, but a
phenomenology based upon what he calls in one of his previous encyclicals a “contemplative
outlook.” This, more specifically, is an outlook that arises from faith in the God of life, who
has created every individual as a “wonder” (cf. Ps 139:14). It is the outlook of those who see
life in its deeper meaning, who grasp its utter gratuitousness, its beauty and its invitation to
freedom and responsibility. It is the outlook of those who do not presume to take possession
of reality but instead accept it as a gift, discovering in all things the reflection of the Creator
and seeing in every person his living image (cf. Gen 1:27; Ps 8:5).18
In short, we are invited—within the specific context of his more recent encyclical,
Veritatis Splendor—to uphold the “essential bond between Truth, the Good and Freedom,”19
and to correct the current tendency of “detaching human freedom from its essential and
constitutive relationship to truth”20—by recognizing and affirming a world that is simply
given at the outset. Ours, John Paul II suggests, is a world which is bestowed as both a fact
(datum) and a gift (donum): a world which, precisely as created, includes us and our freedom,
but which is not simply or necessarily subject to us and our freedom; a world which is
composed of relations and relationships that are given, but given in such a way as to be
wilfully appropriated and fostered by human action: a world which beckons us “to see” and to
affirm. After all, to contemplate, as the German philosopher Josef Pieper fittingly describes it,
“means first of all to see—and not to think!”21
From this perspective, the claim to truth supposes what Aquinas call the “conformity”
(conformitas) or “equation” (adequatio)22—or what the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von
17

Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form, translated by
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis and edited by Joseph Fessio and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982,
1989), 118, 119. See also ibid., 19-20; and Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity, 18.
18
John Paul II, Encyclical on the Gospel of Life, Evangelium Vitae (March 25, 1995), no. 83.
19
Cf. Veritatis Splendor, no. 84.
20
Ibid., no. 4.
21
Josef Pieper, Only the Lover Sings: Art and Contemplation, translated by Lothar Krauth (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1990), 73.
22
“True expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an
assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. […] The
first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is
called ‘the conformity of thing and intellect.’ In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true.”
(De Veritate I, 1: “Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio
perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilation dicta est causa cognitionis
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Balthasar calls “attunement” (Einstimmung)23—of our subjective consciousness (perception
or conviction) to objective reality, of our mental and emotional states to the world that God
has created, so as to act accordingly: to “assimilate” the truth, as John Paul II, puts it.24 Or, to
put it in other words, truth and goodness imply the meeting of gifts: God’s goodness calling
forth from human hearts the response of receptive willingness to acknowledge the world and
ourselves as a gift that is not of our making, so as in turn to discern God’s project for the
world and our lives and to act accordingly. As Balthasar reasons, “a person who contemplates
a great work of art has to have a gift – whether inborn or acquired through training – to be
able to perceive and assess its beauty, to distinguish it from mediocre art or kitsch.”25
Similarly, or analogically, the human person is given to participate in God’s
governance of the world precisely by means of his or her spiritual nature – consisting of
intellect and will – wherein also consists his or her likeness to God and whereby he or she is
capable of discerning God’s purpose for the world and for him- or herself in the world. Far
from denying either the human person’s place within (rather than beyond or above) this world
or his bodily being, which is constitutive of our nature as such (i.e. as human), this
perspective thus requires that we be incarnated in the body and in the world. At the same
time, it is a perspective which calls upon the natural aspirations of the human heart to rise, in
ecstasy, above the limits of its own self towards that which is nonetheless proper to itself: the
realization of the self within a communion of persons. As such, it is also an appeal to love: not
as a projection of its self or its own desires upon the beloved, but as a profound affirmation of
the beloved’s own goodness and beauty, radiating forth from his or her interior depths.
In this article, I propose to apply these insights to the specific problematic of modern
feminism, which arose, I will argue in part one, out of women’s rightful opposition to what I
refer to as “the man-made woman”: a combination—in keeping with Dupré’s categories
referred to above—of a naturalist, a dialectical, and an idealist conception (more in the
Platonic than the Enlightenment sense) of woman. Such, is also, I will argue in this first part,
the origin of the feminist refusal of the body, as “man” sees and manipulates it, but also as
woman herself (that is to say, the feminist) sees it: namely as a means to oppression. In part
two, I will present the modern conflict, so exemplary in the history of feminism, between
nature and freedom and the consequential attempt of our contemporaries to re-make the
human body. In part three, with the help of the distinction between what Karol Wojtyla calls
the natural and the biological orders, I will present the positive challenge to adopt his
“contemplative outlook” – upon the world and upon our body-selves. This, more specifically,
I will argue in part four, is a regard which we might take as an invitation to “get out of our
heads,” or to transcend the influence of modernity, much of which attempts to transcend the
God-given world of creation within, ironically enough, the immanence of the finite human
mind.26 In part five, I will argue that the consideration of the God-given value, or meaning, of
[…] Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspndeat: quae quidem correspondentia,
adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur.”) Marietti edition. English
translation by Robert Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952). See also ST I, q. 16, a. 1; and Yves
Floucat, La vérité selon saint Thomas d’Aquin. Le réalisme de la connaissance (Paris: Téqui, 2009).
23
See, for example, The Glory of the Lord I, 241ff.
24
See Veritatis Splendor, no. 52.
25
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, 75.
26
This is not to deny that the human soul is, as Aristotle taught, in some sense all things, nor that the human
person is, according to the formulation of St. Augustine of Hippo (cf. De Trinitate, XIV, 8): “capax Dei,”
capable of [the infinite] God, because capable of grace (cf. ST I-II, q. 113, a. 10 / De Veritate 22, 2, ad. 5). Nor
still would we object to the teaching of Aquinas, according to which “it must be absolutely granted that the
blessed see the essence of God” (ST I, q. 12, a. 1: “simpliciter concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam
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womanhood sets us before a mystery of the self destined to communion. Herein, more
specifically, we might discover both the destiny and the vocation to love and communion, as
are inscribed within our bodies, but also within our souls: by, that is to say, our natural
intrinsic orientation to truth and goodness, which we might analogically compare to the
beautiful. From this perspective of the world as created by an all-loving and all-powerful God,
human sexuality, I will reiterate, has a profoundly metaphysical value: one that literally
transcends (meta) the physical. It is, in fact, the specifically spiritual nature of human persons
– not withstanding the real fecundity of our bodies – which enables us to be co-creators with
our God: artists by way of our attunement to the Creator’s mind and purpose. Something of
this mystery of attunement might be explained, as we will see in part six, by the manner in
which a human lover invites his beloved to “live up” to the image that he guards of her in his
heart. Similarly, or analogically, we will argue, in concluding, that the Christian is invited by
the loving regard of God, in his incarnate Son, to become who she or he is: the image and
likeness of God.
I. Feminist Opposition to the Man-Made Woman and the Subsequent Refusal of
the Body as Given
In order to better appreciate this creational perspective – which, as I mentioned will be
treated more thoroughly in the third and concluding parts of this conference – we might first
take a quick survey of feminist thought which often stands not only in contrast, but even in
direct opposition to this perspective. This, I suggest we might do by turning to an ancient
Greek legend, describing the delightful wonder of a young child who patiently observes a
sculptor chiselling at a marble block. Eventually there emerges—after many months of
persistent hard labour—a beautiful white horse. Upon perceiving the horse for the first time,
the delighted child cries out to the sculptor with respectful awe: “How did you know that
there was a horse in that stone?”
We smile at the simplicity of the child who thinks that the artist’s work consists of
setting free, as it were, the trapped horse. Yet many early feminists rightfully conceived of
their work in precisely these terms: that of allowing woman (exemplified by the horse) to give
expression to the fullness of her natural attributes which had been imprisoned, as it were, by
social constraints prohibiting her from actualizing her God-given freedom in such a way as to
realize herself and her destiny; whence the liberating work of freeing the horse from the heavy
block of marble. For these early feminists, the block of marble might thus be interpreted as
social expectations that not only weighed her down, but also subjected her to man’s vision of
herself: a vision which all too often, as not only the well-known French feminist philosopher
Simone de Beauvoir,27 but also Sr. Prudence Allen,28 Thomas Laqueur,29 and Sylviane
videant”). However, it is also important to admit that: “The faculty of seeing God […] does not belong to the
created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of
deiformity.” (ibid., a. 6:”Facultas autem videndi Deum non competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam,
sed per lumen gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit”).
27
See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated and edited by H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage
Books, 1989. (Le deuxième sexe I: Les faits et les mythes; II: L’expérience vécue (Paris: Gallimard, 1949,
1976). Beauvoir’s position will be exposed below.
28
See Prudence Allen, RSM, The Concept of Woman, I: The Aristotelian Revolution, 750 BC-AD 1250 (Grand
Rapids, MI /Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 1997); idem, The Concept of Woman II: The Early Humanist Reform,
1250-1500 (Grand Rapids, MI / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 2002); and Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Ethical Equality
in a New Feminism,” in Women in Christ: Towards a New Feminism, edited by Michele M. Schumacher (Grand
Rapids, MI / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmanns, 2004), 285-296.
29
“I return again and again in this book to a problematic, unstable female body that is either a version of or
wholly different from a generally unproblematic, stable male body. As feminist scholars have made abundantly
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Agacinski30 and many others have very aptly argued, was merely a projection of man’s own
identity as normative upon her or, at best, a projection of his own interests upon her; whence
the emphasis upon her roles as his mistress or as the mother of his descendants and not as a
person in her own right.31
To be sure, the notion of woman was historically viewed as a co-relative term, which
is not to admit that it merely corresponds to our ever-changing mental states and not to
anything in the real world. Rather, by this designation I mean to point to the fact that we
understand the meaning of the word woman (like the reality that it signifies) in terms of its
(her) relation to another term (corresponding to another reality or being), namely man. Man,
in contrast, is both a generic term for all that is human (so as to include the concept of
woman) and a gendered term (specifying the male sex). “The masculine is a ‘gender’ which is
defined less by its relation to the feminine [in much of the history of philosophy] than by the
capacity to rise above sexual duality,” Sylviane Agacinski explains. “The masculine, like
genus, is not in a relation of lateral opposition, if you will, to the feminine […] but in the
position of a foundation: he is to the feminine that which the pure is to the impure, the
primary to the second, the good to the evil, the original to the derived.”32
This, in other words, is a profoundly androcentric account of sexual differentiation: “It
is always the woman who differs from the man in the classic anthropological discourse,
whether philosophical or theological,” Agacinski continues, “whereas the feminine is
subordinate to the masculine. The woman differs from the man; never the inverse, as if the
masculine point of view was neutral, that of the universal human genus (genre), whereas the
feminine would be ‘gender’ (‘genre’) different from genus (genre), always a little degenerate,
derived, exotic, failing, particular, minor.”33
This distinction between the very broad concept of man and the necessarily restraint
meaning of woman is perhaps the point at which much of the difficulty in gender theory – or
better said, the “ideology”34 of gender – begins. For unlike the concept of man, which is
clear, it is always woman’s sexuality that is being constituted; woman is the empty category. Woman alone
seems to have ‘gender’ since the category itself is defined as that aspect of social relations based on difference
between sexes in which the standard has always been man.” (Thomas Laqueur, The Making of Sex: Body and
Gender from the Greeks to Freud [Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press,1990], 22).
30
See Sylviane Agacinski, Métaphysique des sexes. Masculin / Féminin aux sources du christianisme (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 2005). Agaskinski’s position will be exposed below.
31
Sylviane Agacinski contrast’s Beauvoir’s theory according to which a woman’s fecundity “constitutes a
natural inferiority and a handicap” with that of Françoise Hériter, who recognizes in the traditional hierarchy of
the sexes the effect of men’s attempt to control reproduction. One might in fact, Agacinski reasons, imagine that
“a man’s uncertainty about his own paternity, as well as his incapacity to fully master the process of conception,
constitute a handicap for him, inciting him to appropriate one or more women so as to be assured of
descendants.” (Ibid., 83). Agacinski holds to the second of these hypotheses as more probable.
32
Ibid., 8. See also Michele M. Schumacher, “The ‘Nature’ of Nature in Feminism: From Dualism to Unity” in
idem (ed.), Women in Christ: Towards a New Feminism (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, MI, 2004), 17-51.
33
Ibid., 9.
34

It is not without good reason, as shall become increasingly apparent, that Élizabeth Montfort prefers to speak
of the “ideology of gender” than “the theory of gender.” In using the term “theory,” its proponents would have us
believe that it is an already validated scientific hypothesis, when in fact it is only “an opinion at best an opinion,
an ideology at worst.” (Élizabeth Montfort, Le genre démasqué. Homme ou femme ? Le choix impossible
[Valence: Éditions Peuple Libre, 2011], 15). Marguerite Peeters, on the other hand, argues that gender is “not an
ideology in the proper sense of the term,” since the word “evokes systems of thought linked to Western
modernity,” and gender is, she insists, “a postmodern phenomenon.” (Marguerite A. Peeters, “Gender: An
Anthropological Deconstruction and a Challenge for Faith” in Pontificium Consilium pro Laicis, Woman and
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linguistically and philosophically associated with all that is human, that of women is one
which can never be hidden in the general. Woman is always specified by her sex; whence the
problematic encounter that much of modernity sought to avoid: the confrontation between the
general and the specific (or the particular and the universal), a confrontation which inevitably
challenges the modern idea of the human being as self-creating, and which, as John Paul II
explains in Veritatis Splendor, obscures “the perception of the universality of the moral law
on the part of reason.”35 Here, in other words, we are confronted with the idea that there is
something necessary about being a woman: something that is determined at the outset and not
accorded to her in virtue of her own freedom.
At the same time, the specificity of the concept of woman sets man before another
being who is not simply a projection of himself or of his idea of the world; whence man’s
presentation of woman as “Other.” As Simone de Beauvoir, would have it in her now classic
argument: “She [woman] is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the
Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”36
Certainly, feminists had good reason to argue against this reductionist vision of
woman – a vision making of her the exception to the masculine rule and not a person in her
own right – but they did not always respond in such a way as to protect women’s best
interests: her interests qua woman. In view of obtaining a place in a man’s world, they all too
often simply played by his rules, as Elisabeth Badinter37 approvingly remarks and Gertrude
von le Fort, disapprovingly.38 They adapted man’s vision of the world and of the human –
which, of course, was that of the normative male – obscuring any traits that might distinguish
her from man, with her life-bearing potentiality at the top of the list. Seeking, more
specifically, to divert man’s objectifying regard – one which would render woman nothing
more than the object of man’s interest (what Jean-Paul Sartre calls an “in-itself,” an “en soi,”
as differing from a “for-itself,” a “pour soi” / corresponding roughly to the difference between
an object and a subject),39 early feminist philosophers and theoreticians simply conformed to
the masculine norm of personhood, freedom, and sex,40 whence the appropriate title of a
recent book in French, L’Homme est l’avenir de la femme (“Man is the future of woman”).41

Man: The Humanum in its Entirety. International Congress on the 20th anniversary of John Paul II’s Apostolic
Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem, 1988-2008 [Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2010], 289-99, here 289,
290).
35

John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, no. 51
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, xxii.
37
See her Dead End Feminism, translated by Julia Borossa (Cambridge / Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006).
[Fausse route (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003)].
38
“She [the early feminist] tried to share man’s intellectual world and sank to the level merely of his methods. In
the social world she sought for space to develop her deepest potentialities and allowed herself instead to be
inserted as a link in his apparatus. In a doubly fatal way she succumbed as woman to the very one-sidedness, to
the mistakes and the dangers upon which the man of the period had sickened. The error lay not so much in the
objectives of the feminist movement and in the situations it created as in the character of the epoch, which, in its
spiritual life, no longer knew its obligations or the direction of its final goal.” (Gertrud von le Fort, The Eternal
Woman, 60).
39
Sylviane Agacinski explains the distinction between an “en soi” and a “pour soi” as the difference “between
the being who is only that which it is, like a simple object, and a consciousness which can choose itself freely, an
authentic subject” (Politique des sexes [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998, 2001], 85).
40
“The great battle for the right to contraception and abortion was waged as much in order to reclaim power over
procreation as it was for obtaining new sexual freedoms. ‘A mother, if I choose to be’ also meant ‘enjoy sex
36
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“Man’s design,” as Simone de Beauvoir saw it, for example, “is not to repeat himself
in time [to reproduce descendants]: it is to take control of the instant and mold the future. It is
male activity that in creating values has made of existence itself a value [whence the
distinction between living in a properly human, i.e. rational, manner and simply living]; this
activity has prevailed over the confused forces of life; it has subdued Nature and Woman.”
This subjection has occurred, Beauvoir reasons, by way of a sort of identification of women
with nature. “Men,” she argues, “have presumed to create a feminine domain – the kingdom
of life, of immanence – only in order to lock up women therein.”42
Such, more specifically, is what Beauvoir calls the paternalistic “myth” defining
woman “as sentiment, inwardness, immanence.”43 “If, [in fact, Beauvoir reasons,] well before
puberty and sometimes even from early infancy, she [the little girl] seems to us to be already
sexually determined, this is not because mysterious instincts directly doom her to passivity,
coquetry, maternity; it is because the influence of others upon the child is a factor almost from
the start, and thus she is indoctrinated with her vocation from her earliest years.”44
With these words from The Second Sex, published in 1949, Beauvoir might well have
inaugurated the important distinction, which later feminists theoreticians will name sex and
gender: the distinction, in other words, between that which is naturally or biologically
determined in sexual differentiation and that which is socially, or culturally, determined; or to
put it in terms of behavioural psychology, between nature and nurture. Hence the famous
Beauvoirian phrase: “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.”45 Curiously, however,
she does not drive a wedge between the two as do later theoreticians, as we shall see, by
arguing that there is no connection between the female body and the manner in which it is
culturally presented.46 Instead, she drives a wedge between woman’s spirit and her body, so
as, in fact, to actually fuel the argument in favour of biological determinism.
To be sure, Beauvoir must be applauded for her refusal to admit, as did later feminists,
a division between man and woman which would polarize them into two species, as it were.47
“To pose Woman,” Beauvoir objects, “is to pose the absolute Other, without reciprocity,
denying against all experience that she is a subject, a fellow human being.”48 In this context
the famous French feminist appears to endorse what Pope John Paul II will present nearly 40

without any limits’. And so the first wave of feminism not only largely contributed to the liberation of women,
but also to the trivialization of sexuality.” (Elisabeth Badinter, Dead End Feminism, 65-66).
41
Natacha Polony, L’Homme est l’avenir de la femme, Autopsie du féminisme contemporain (Paris, C Lattès,
2008).
42
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 65.
43
Ibid., 255.
44
Ibid., 268.
45
Ibid., 267. Similarly: “Biology is not enough to give an answer to the question that is before us: why is woman
the Other?” (ibid., 37).
46
Judith Butler, for example, reasons: “For Beauvoir, gender is ‘constructed,’ but implied in her formulation is
an agent, a cogito, who somehow takes on or appropriates that gender and could, in principle, take on some other
gender.” There is nothing in Beauvoir’s account, Butler continues, “that guarantees that the ‘one’ who becomes a
woman is necessarily female.” (Gender Trouble, 8).
47
This is especially true of the European continental approach that stressed differences between the sexes, unlike
the Anglo-Saxon approach which highlighted likenesses. See Karen Offen, “Defining Feminism: A Comparative
Historical Approach,” Signs 14 (1988): 119-57; and Beatriz Vollmer Coles, “New Feminism: A Sex-Gender
Reunion” in Women in Christ: Toward a New Feminism, edited by Michele M. Schumacher (Cambridge &
Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 52-66.
48
The Second Sex, 253.
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years later as “another ‘I’ in a common humanity.”49 Beauvoir nonetheless – and in this she
obviously differs from the approach of John Paul II – goes so far in her argument for the
equality of the sexes that she simply alleviates the differences between them, with the result
that they can no longer be viewed as a “unity of the two,” a “uni-duality,” or a communion of
persons preserving the “specific diversity and personal originality” of both sexes.50
At first view of her work, it might appear as if Beauvoir is taking up the important
feminist argument against biological determinism: the reduction of woman to what lies within
the realm of her body and its working, as is expressed in the “anatomy is destiny” philosophy.
Such, more specifically, is the notion that a woman’s identity is inscribed in her body, as in
stone (or marble, to return to the image above): an idea which is at odds with the metaphysical
meaning of human sexuality, as I will expose it below. Beauvoir, however, does not so much
present women as “condemned to passivity by society, according to an arbitrary decree of
men,” as (instead) “maintained in an inertia to which nature had initially destined them.”
Hence, French philosopher Sylviane Agacinski reasons, she might just as well have admitted
to biological determinism from the outset and written instead: “one does not become, but
remains, a woman.”51 Or to put it otherwise: precisely in order to avoid the idea of a properly
feminine nature which men (or so Beauvoir believes) had in their creation of culture, aligned
with the animal (or sub-rational) realm at odds with the normative male (or rational) nature,52
Beauvoir simply refuses to grant any metaphysical content to sexual differences.53 In so
doing, she creates a dualism within woman herself: a dualism between her body and her soul,
or between nature, understood in the most base sense of the term – namely that which is subrational and fully determined – and reason, which is considered as constituting the essence of
49

John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, Apostolic Letter, “On the Dignity and Vocation of Women” on the
occasion of the Marian Year (August 15, 1988), no. 6.
50
See John Paul II, “Letter to Women” on the occasion of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing
(June 29, 1995), in Origins 25: 9 (July 27, 1995), nos. 7-8; and idem, Mulieris Dignitatem, nos. 7, 10. Similar is
what Hans Urs von Balthasar calls, with reference to Albert Frank-Duquene, “a dual-unity.” See Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Theo-Drama (Theological Dramatic Theory) II: The Dramatis Personae: Man in God, translated by
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 365-66; with reference to Albert Frank-Duquesne,
Création et procréation (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1951), 42-46.
51
Sylviane Agacinski, Politique des sexes (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998, 2001), 93. The celebrated Beauvorian
phrase, “One is not born, but becomes a woman” “concerns historical, aquired alienation: the woman is here an
artificial product. She is fabricated by history, enclosed within a convential role, obliged to bend to the status of
an object and to passivity imposed upon her by society. But, behind this fabriacated women there is a second,
natural woman, who is already alienated. This is a being who is biologically trapped: a victim primarily of her
membership to the species, which destines her to fecundity and procreation and consquently to passivity. Women
are not then simply condemned to passivity by society, according to an arbitrary decree of men: they are rather
maintained in an inertia to which nature had initially destined them. In other words, the fabricated and alienated
woman is the woman who remains in her natural alienation. Simone de Beauvoir could thus have said, in
imagining this biological destiny that she rejects: one does not become, but remains a woman” (ibid.).
52
“Man’s design is not to repeat himself in time: it is to take control of the instant and mold the future. It is male
activity that in creating values has made of existence itself a value; this activity has prevailed over the confused
forces of life; it has subdued Nature and Woman.” (The Second Sex, 65).
53
Beauvoir is thus paradigmatic of a problematic that I have observed in much feminist thought: “[T]he bodyspirit dualism that they [feminists] so often attribute to ‘androcentric’ logic is transformed – as feminists have
not only observed but also advanced – into a male-female dualism which, in turn, has given birth to a sort of
androgynous hybrid that is both ideological and reactionary. Denied or otherwise refused are thus the essential
differences within human nature itself – namely sexual differences affecting the whole body-spirit whole of the
human person – in virtue of which this nature might be understood as relational per se.” (Michele M.
Schumacher, “Feminism, Nature and Humanae Vitae: What’s Love Got to Do with It?,” Nova et Vetera (English
Edition) 6, no. 4 (2008): 879-900, here 884-85). On the feminist denial of metaphysical differences of the sexes,
see Beatriz Vollmer de Marcellus, The Ontological Differentiation of Human Gender: A Critique of the
Philosophical Literature between 1965 and 1995 (Philadelphia, Xlibris, 2004); and idem (published under her
married name of Coles), “New Feminism: A Sex-Gender Reunion.”
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the human. Admitting that it is woman’s “misfortune” to be “biologically destined”54 to
transmit life and thus “more enslaved to the species”55 than is man, Beauvoir thus counsels
her to flee the body and its constraints: to rise above the so-called “animal” act of giving life
and to participate instead in the properly masculine act of risking life, beginning (presumably)
with her battle against men.56
One could hardly provide a better example of what Pope John Paul II presents as “the
tension between freedom and a nature conceived of in a reductive way,” a tension which is
finally “resolved,” he explains, “by a division within man himself”57 or, in this case, woman
herself, and ultimately within the communion of man and woman, the fundamental cell of the
family and thus also of society.
II. The Nature-Freedom Conflict of Modernity and the Re-Making of the Human
Body
Here, in the reasoning of Beauvoir, like that of so many other feminists following in
her wake,58 we are confronted, more specifically, with the presumed conflict, marking the
history of modernity, between human freedom, which has become supreme, and the idea of a
God-given nature which is ironically understood as lying entirely within the physical (subrational) realm. As such – as material and thus as immanent – nature is also, or consequently,
subject to man’s manipulative efforts. At times within this history, John Paul II instructs us in
Veritatis Splendor, “it seemed that ‘nature’ subjected man totally to its own dynamics and
even its own unbreakable laws.” Even today, he continues, certain ethicists are “tempted to
take as the standard for their discipline and even for its operative norms the results of a
statistical study of concrete human behaviour patterns and the opinions about morality
encountered in the majority of people.” Others, more “sensitive to the dignity of freedom”
conceive of it as opposed to or “in conflict with material and biological nature, over which it
must progressively assert itself.” Hence, the origin of two contrasting, even opposed,
understandings of nature:
For some, “nature” becomes reduced to raw material for human activity and for its
power: thus nature needs to be profoundly transformed, and indeed overcome by freedom,
inasmuch as it represents a limitation and denial of freedom. For others, it is in the
untrammeled advancement of man's power, or of his freedom, that economic, cultural, social
and even moral values are established: nature would thus come to mean everything found in
man and the world apart from freedom. In such an understanding, nature would include in the
54

The Second Sex, 64. « Son malheur, c’est d’avoir été biologiquement vouée à répéter la Vie » (Le Deuxième
Sexe I, 114).
55
“And likewise it is quite true that woman—like man—is a being rooted in nature; she is more enslaved to the
species than is the male, her animality is more manifest; but in her as in him the given traits are taken on though
the fact of existence, she belongs also to the human realm. To assimilate her to Nature is simply to act from
prejudice” (The Second Sex, 255; Le Deuxième Sexe I, 398: “Il est de même tout à fait vrai que la femme est –
comme l’homme – un être enraciné dans la nature ; elle est plus que le mâle asservie à l’espèce, son animalité est
la plus manifeste ; mais en elle comme en lui le donné est assumé par l’existence, elle appartient aussi au règne
humain. L’assimiler à la Nature c’est un simple parti pris” (Le Deuxième Sexe I 398).
56
See ibid., 64. Le Deuxième Sexe I, 114-15.
57
Veritatis Splendor, no. 48.
58
A recent example might be found in Elisabeth Badinter’s book, The Conflict: How Modern Motherhood
Undermines the Status of Women, translated by Adriana Hunter (New York: Metropolitan Books / Henry Holt
and Co., 2011) (Le Conflit, la femme et la mère [Paris: Flammarion, 2010]). See Michele M. Schumacher,
“Women’s Self-Interest or Sacrificial Motherhood: Personal Desires, Natural Inclinations and the Meaning of
Love,” The Thomist 77 (2013).
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first place the human body, its make-up and its processes: against this physical datum would
be opposed whatever is “constructed”, in other words “culture”, seen as the product and result
of freedom. Human nature, understood in this way, could be reduced to and treated as a
readily available biological or social material. This ultimately means making freedom selfdefining and a phenomenon creative of itself and its values. Indeed, when all is said and done
man would not even have a nature; he would be his own personal life-project. Man would be
nothing more than his own freedom!59
As a case in point, we need only think of the contemporary ideology of gender.
Whereas gender was once regarded as a cultural expression of biological sex, recent
theoreticians argue that it is culture (and thus gender) that determines bodily sex and not, the
inverse (sex that determines gender). “[T]here is no recourse to a body that has not always
already been interpreted by cultural meanings;” reasons humanities professor Judith Butler.
“[H]ence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity. Indeed, sex, by
definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.”60 As for gender, this term must not
be understood as being related to culture “as sex is to nature,” Butler argues. Rather, gender
should be understood, she continues, as “the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed
nature’ or ‘a natural sex’ is produced and established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to culture, a
politically neutral surface on which culture acts.”61 Sex, in other words, is thought to have no
intrinsic meaning or content that is not first given to it by culture.
Butler’s claim is supported, at least implicitly, by history professor Thomas Laqueur,
who seeks to “offer [historial] material [or accounts] for [demonstrating] how powerful prior
notions of difference or sameness determine what one sees and reports about the body,” and
thus for “deciding what counts and what does not count as evidence.”62 Laqueur thus makes
“every effort,” as he puts it, “to show that no historically given set of facts about ‘sex’
entailed how sexual difference was in fact understood and represented […], and I use this
evidence,” he continues, “to make the more general claim that no set of facts ever entails any
particular account of difference.”63 As for biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, she argues that
“labelling someone a man or a woman is a social decision. We may use scientific knowledge
to help us make the decision, but only our beliefs about gender – not science – can define our
sex. Furthermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists produce
about sex in the first place.”64 In other words, scientists “create truths about sexuality,” which
are subsequently incorporated and confirmed by our bodies.65 Indeed, Fausto-Sterling’s own
analysis of the “construction of sexuality” and her preference for “theories of sexuality that
allow for flexibility and the development of new behaviour patterns” can hardly be divorced
from her own “deep” commitment “to the ideas of the modern movements of gay and
women’s liberation”66 and from her personal experience of living, as she puts it, “part of her
life as an unabashed heterosexual, part as an unabashed lesbian, and part in transition.”67
Denied from the outset is what she calls – borrowing from Donna Haraway –“the God
trick”: “producing,” that is to say, “knowledge from above, from a place that denies the
59
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individual scholar’s location in a real and troubled world.”68 Such, more specifically, she
suggests, is a world in which it is not always so easy to determine – biologically-speaking –
whether a child is male or female.
If a child is born with two X chromosomes, oviducts, ovaries, and a uterus on the
inside, but a penis and scrotum on the outside, for instance, is the child a boy or a girl? Most
doctors declare the child a girl, despite the penis, because of her potential to give birth, and
intervene using surgery and hormones to carry out the decision. Choosing which criteria to
use in determining sex, and choosing to make the determination at all, are social decisions for
which scientists can offer no absolute guidelines.69
It is thus not surprising that Judith Butler should ask the question: What is ‘sex’
anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to
assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such ‘facts’ for us?”70
One could hardly find a better question for introducing the important distinction,
which will also serve my transition between this brief exposition of feminist teaching on what
constitutes womanhood as such and a classic metaphysical (and thus also realist)
understanding of the same. This, more specifically, is the distinction made by Karol Wojtyla
between the biological order and “the order of nature.”
III. The Biological Order and the Order of Nature: An Important Distinction
Unlike most feminist and gender theoreticians today – who simply equate nature and
biology or a naturalist philosophy (passing as physicalism) and natural law – Wojtyla presents
biology as “a product of the human intellect which abstracts its elements from a larger reality,
[and which] has man for its immediate author. The claim to autonomy in one’s ethical views,”
he further maintains, “is a short jump from this.” In other words, when man is seen as the
creator of the world order, relativism is the most logical ethical theory: how can one defend
the idea of universal truths and even the idea of intrinsic human dignity, when man creates
man? “It is otherwise,” Wojtyla continues, “with the order of nature, which means the totality
of the cosmic relationships that arise among really existing entities.”71
As we have seen in the foregoing exposition, it is this totality of relationships, which
are not only realized by human freedom but also and most especially given to human
freedom, that is denied by much feminist literature, beginning with the fundamental and
constitutive relation between the human body and spirit, which precisely as unified, is, John
Paul II teaches, the subject of moral acts.72 “Only in reference to the human person in his
‘unified totality’, that is, as ‘a soul which expresses itself in a body and a body informed by an
immortal spirit’, can the specifically human meaning of the body be grasped,” John Paul II
teaches in Veritatis Splendor. It thus follows, according to Church teaching, that natural
inclinations have “moral relevance only insofar as they refer to the human person and his
68
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authentic fulfilment, a fulfilment,” John Paul II adds, which “can take place always and only
in human nature.”73
In fact, natural law refers, he further teaches, to “the ‘nature of the human person’,
which is the person himself in the unity of soul and body, in the unity of [both] his spiritual
and biological inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary for the
pursuit of his end. ‘The natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes” of human
life, which is to say, that we are created with divine intent and not chaotically set into a
chaotic world so as to find our own chaotic way. At the same time, natural law is considered
moral precisely because it also lays down the “rights and duties” of the human person, which
John Paul II presents as “based” upon his or her “bodily and spiritual nature.” “Therefore this
law cannot be thought of as simply a set of norms on the biological level [so as to be reduced
to that which we share with sub-rational creation]; rather it must be defined as the rational
order whereby man [that is to say, man and woman] is called by the Creator to direct and
regulate his [or her] life and actions and in particular to make use of his [or her] own
body’.”74 And, because human nature always includes human freedom, natural law not only
cannot be interpreted as physicalism or naturalism, such that moral laws are reduced to
“biological laws,”75 but it also will allow for no division between freedom and nature.
“Indeed, these two realities are harmoniously bound together,” John Paul II insists, “and each
is intimately linked to the other.”76
This, in turn, means that we cannot assent to the proposition according to which the
human person, precisely “as a rational being not only can but actually must freely determine
the meaning of his [or her] behaviour,”77 and thus surmount or transcend his or her bodily
limitations. Just as the human person cannot be reduced to his or her bodily structure and its
functioning, so also he or she “cannot,” John Paul II teaches, “be reduced to a freedom which
is self-designing.” Human freedom quite simply “entails,” as he puts it “a particular spiritual
and bodily structure.”78
Such a metaphysical perspective of human nature – one which, it bears repeating,
literally transcends (meta) the physical – does not only have implications upon the manner in
which we perceive natural law and human freedom. It also affects the way we view human
sexuality. As the Catechism puts it so well, sexuality “affects all aspects of the human person
in the unity of his [or her] body and soul” and thus also, more specifically, of “affectivity, the
capacity to love and to procreate, and in a more general way the aptitude for forming bonds of
communion with others.”79 It follows that this primal unity of the body and the soul,
constituting the human person as such, has profound implications upon the other cosmic
relations to which Wojtyla refers with his distinction between the biological and natural
orders, beginning with the relation of the family, that “first and fundamental school of social
73
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living,”80 and still more fundamentally, the relation between man and woman, who are “called
from the beginning […] not only to exist ‘side by side’ or ‘together,’” but also, John Paul II
teaches, “to exist mutually ‘one for the other.’”81
When God-Yahweh says, “It is not good that the man should be alone” (Gen 2:18), he
affirms that, “alone,” the man does not completely realize this essence. He realizes it only by
existing “with someone” – and, put even more deeply and completely, by existing “for
someone.” (…) Communion of persons means living in a reciprocal “for,” in a relationship of
reciprocal gift.82
From this perspective – that of creation – human sexuality is not simply arbitrary; nor
is it merely “skin deep.” Rather, it is orientated – precisely as an essential aspect of human
nature – to the vocation implied within the very gift of human nature, as rational. This, in
turn, does not meant that human sexuality is simply subject to human freedom; for it is not
human freedom that has brought it into existence, nor human freedom that gives it meaning.
Rather, both freedom and sexuality are subject together, in a body-spirit unity, to the divinelyordained meaning of human existence: a meaning which Christ has revealed as love. It is
freedom’s role to discover this meaning and to constantly discern its own intentions according
to this standard (the meaning of love), so as also to direct the whole person (body and soul)
toward what is worthy of love. It is the body’s role, in turn, to serve reason in its discernment
of the Creator’s intentions; for it is in virtue of the body that we enter into relation with all of
material reality – we need only think of the role of the senses, which require direct contact
with that which is thereby perceived – and it is also in virtue of the body that we enter into
relationships with other body-persons. “The person, by the light of reason and the support of
virtue, [thus] discovers in the body,” John Paul II teaches, “the anticipatory signs, the
expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity with the wise plan of the
Creator.”83
To assent to this proposition – that the body expresses the Creator’s intentions for us –
one must have a certain confidence in reality: confidence – or better said, faith – that things
really do bespeak the intentions of a wholly benevolent and supremely intelligent Creator who
orders all things to their good in accord with the natures that He has bestowed upon them at
the moment of creation. This in no way denies – rather it reinforces – the teaching of classic
natural law theory according to which God orders human creatures “in the most excellent
manner,”84 namely by giving us the capacity to govern ourselves: not in an anarchical sense –
as creatures who deem themselves no longer subject to divine rule and order – but as capable,
in virtue of our intelligent nature, of discerning God’s will and of acting accordingly, that is to
say, virtuously.
In the unavoidable confrontation with sexual differentiation, which marks the history
of humankind from its inception, the human person is thus presented with a mystery that is
80
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simultaneously given, in virtue of creation, and appropriated, in virtue of human freedom.85
This, in other words, is a mystery which is given in both the creative and gratuitous senses of
the word: a fact robed in gratuity. As such, it transcends the expertise of both the biological
and the social sciences, evoking a reality that is not of our making, but that is nonetheless
knowable and desirable to us. This, more specifically, is – as has been my purpose to argue –
a reality which does not merely exist in our consciousness, but which, on the contrary, is
offered to our consciousness in view of our willing appropriation and collaboration. As such,
it is at once a gift and a call.
To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion. […] The whole of
human history unfolds within the context of this call. In this history, on the basis of the
principle of mutually being “for” the other, in interpersonal “communion,” there develops in
humanity itself, in accordance with God’s will, the integration of what is “masculine” and
what is “feminine.”86
Or to put it otherwise (again, in the words of Blessed John Paul II): “Human life is by
its nature ‘co-educational,’ and its dignity as well as its balance depend at every moment of
history and in every place of geographic longitude and latitude on ‘who’ she shall be for him
and he for her.”87
IV. An Objective Regard upon Woman: An Invitation to Get Out of Our Heads
While this particular question or call is necessarily personal, it also has a social
dimension; for precisely in the vis-à-vis, which sexual differentiation represents, modern men
and women are offered a perspective that forces them to get out of their heads, as it were, and
to confront an objective reality which is not of their making. An object cannot protect itself
from someone’s false understanding of its being, nor from his or her manipulative tactics or
misuse of its God-ordained purpose in the world. A person, however – and obviously I have
woman in mind – can well object to man’s idea of herself and of her destiny, as Beauvoir
rightly insisted, and thus also to his manipulative regard upon her. Here, then, in the
encounter or confrontation of persons, there is also an encounter or confrontation with real
objectivity: of a world which is not necessarily subject to man’s ideas and purposes, a world
which invites an objective regard, or a perspective of truth in the classic understanding of the
term, namely an adequation – or what Hans Urs von Balthasar calls “attunement” – between
perception and reality, between subject and object, between knower and known.
From this perspective – that of a given (even gratuitously-given) reality – the
challenge of addressing sexual difference is not simply that of rethinking the way we
approach scientific knowledge; for the fundamental question is more philosophical than
experimental. This, to be precise, entails an epistemological question: one concerning how we
view knowledge and knowing, and how we distinguish the two (the reality known from the
process of knowing). When, in other words, we are confronted with the question of what is
entailed in being a woman, as distinct from being a man – the question motivating John Paul
II’s important apostolic letter, Mulieris dignitatem88– we are simultaneously confronted
85
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within our present cultural situation with a more fundamental, or preliminary, question: that
of what constitutes knowledge in the first place. This, more specifically, is the question of
whether knowing entails a manipulation of reality – a sort of bending of the known according
to my field of interest, such that the object (or person, as the case may be) must succumb to
my preconceived notion of the real (whence Beauvoir’s theory of Woman as ‘Other’) – or
whether, instead, knowing entails a conformity of my knowing powers to an objective reality:
to the object known. In the latter case, it is I who, in fact or at least as a matter of speaking,
must bend to the object, allowing it to speak to me, as it were, to inform me, to impress itself
upon me, or to otherwise enrich me with its intrinsic goodness and beauty.
Entailed in the question of womanhood – the problem of discerning its content or
meaning – is thus the question of our philosophical perspective: the question of whether I
hold to a modern perspective, according to which the meaning of womanhood is determined,
or at least measured by, my inner, subjective, convictions; to a nihilistic position, according to
which the notion of woman signifies absolutely nothing at all; to an existentialist perspective
of the Sartrian kind (which is also that of Beauvoir), according to which woman is defined
either by her own freedom or by that of man who constantly seeks to determine her for his
own purposes or desires; to a constructionist standpoint, which considers her as an everevolving social construct with no intrinsic meaning; to a post-modern stance, according to
which the meaning of “woman” is determined by opposition: not in the co-relative sense of
the term, but in the violent struggle between the oppressed (in this case, woman) and the
oppressor (man); or, finally, to a realist perspective, according to which the content that we
assign to the word “woman,” exists in reality and not merely in our heads: a position which is
maintained, at least indirectly, by those who argue that human sexuality is socially
constructed).
To admit to this realist position – as I hope by now to have made clear – is hardly to
reduce woman to a purely material being. Nor is it to take from her the freedom of selfdetermination (as distinct from self-designing or self-creating) or to remove her from the
romantic world of mystery and the creative world of art. Nor, still, is it to separate her from
the loving and providential regard of her Creator. Rather, it means grounding, and thus
safeguarding, her freedom in her God-given human nature, such that she is free with a
freedom destined for what is good and true and noble: a freedom which is realized in self-gift,
because the person is realized in communion. “Freedom,” Karol Wojyla explains, “exists for
love,” which in turn means the “limit[ing] of one’s freedom on behalf of another.” It follows,
Woytla reasons, that the human being “longs for love more than for freedom – freedom is the
means and love the end.”89
Far from the very restrained, or negative sense of freedom which has marked much of
modernity, in general, and feminism, in particular – freedom from oppression, for example, or
freedom from constraint – we are thus invited to consider it as having a positive value in

“understand[ing] the greatness of the dignity and vocation of women” so as, in turn, to address “their [women’s]
active presence in the Church and in society” (Mulieris dignitatem, no. 1).
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Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 135, 136. Similarly: “Perfection demands that maturity is self-giving
to which human freedom is called” (John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, no 17). “Love, as a sincere gift of self, is
what gives the life and freedom of the person their truest meaning” (John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, no. 96).
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virtue of its God-given purpose: freedom for the other, freedom to give of oneself, and
freedom to receive the other as a gift.90
V. The Beauty of Truth and the Attunement to the Real
By introducing the important distinction between the biological order and the natural
order, Wojtyla – who, as we have seen, draws upon this important distinction in his papal
teaching – does not therefore suggest that we might ascribe to some sort of Platonic idea of
womanhood: to, that is to say, an eternal ideal qualifying woman from above, to return to
Haraway’s objection to the so-called “God trick.” Rather, a natural law perspective supposes
that the human being is intrinsically ordered by his or her Creator from within: not by way of
a simple submission to the body, its needs and desires, but in the particularly human way of
freely choosing one’s life’s goal in conformity with reason and faith and of acting
accordingly. It follows that the divine Artist does not simply “draw forms, as it were, from the
interior of matter, of wood, of stone, of marble”—to return to the image of the horse in the
stone—so as to act “on the matter—let us say, even against it,” as does the human artist, as he
is fittingly depicted by Pierre-Marie Emonet:
Michelangelo has defined sculpture: the forza di levare—the “power to lift” the
superfluous stone from around the form, the figure within. And Michelangelo trimmed with
chisels and hammers, sending shots of matter to all sides. There is nothing of this in the divine
acting. […] “When God awakens a new reality, first, he does not act on things, or against
things—as we are obliged to do. God works in them.”91
The divine Artist, in other words, is One whose “creative power” might be found “in
the depths of things,”92 for the “divine influx passes […] through natural agents,” who are
thus “elevated to the order of instrumental causes of the divine causality.”93
As for human agents, precisely as free, we are given by the Creator the power to direct
our lives and to govern the world that He entrusts to us in view of a certain world-order – that
of the various cosmic relations implied by God’s creative act, including most especially the
relation between man and woman – all of which ought to be subject to the fundamental good
of God, whom revelation teaches us, is the final end of the human person. Or to put it still
more directly, we are thus set before the specific task of rationally discerning God’s purpose
for our lives, so as to act accordingly. Such, I would suggest again, is not far from what
Balthasar describes as attunement.
This musical image – precisely as artistic – invites us to return to the image of the
horse in the marble block from still another perspective: that of a classic understanding of art.
Here we have, Francesca Murphy rightly suggests, a vision “for a post-modern society, in
which the idea of a common rationality is threadbare,”94 but in which the basic human desire
90
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for love and beauty is not entirely lost; for the human being remains human and as such
profoundly orientated by nature to what is good and true and thus also beautiful. The
Christian – whom Balthasar presents as the “guardian of that metaphysical wonderment which
is the point of origin for philosophy”95 – nonetheless has a very important role to play in
awakening this natural human desire within the men and women of our time. After all, the
very world, which for our contemporaries is characterized by the “elimination of the sacred
and the loss of the ‘power of the heart’ (Siewerth) to sense the ‘majesty of being’ (Hans
André) in the immediacy of God”—a world which has “no Godward tendency (since it was
become mere matter, an accumulation of facts and its synthesis is man in his state of
wretchedness)” is, Balthasar rightly notes, a world which nonetheless remains sacred for the
Christian as inhabited—even impregnated—by “something of eternity.”96 It follows, as
Balthasar rightly perceives, that only the Christian is joining children in posing the essential
question of being upon which metaphysical inquiry is based: the question, born of
wonderment, as typified by the delighted child discovering the horse in the marble block.97
This, more specifically, is the question: “Why is there anything rather than nothing at all?”
The failure to pose this question is, John Paul II suggests, typical of an impoverished
society motivated by the desire “to possess things rather than to relate them to the truth.” This,
more specifically, he suggests, is a society “lacking that disinterested, unselfish and aesthetic
attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of the beauty which enables one to
see in visible things the message of the invisible God who created them.”98 Such, he suggests
in Veritatis Splendor, is a society for whom beauty, but also goodness, has been isolated from
truth.
To be sure, it is unthinkable for the modern or contemporary mind to refer to beauty as
“true” or even “good,” for we are much too inclined to admit—as I implied in my
introduction—that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Balthasar does not hesitate, however,
to address the idea of “aesthetic measure.”99 As for St. Thomas, he too insists upon the
objective dimension of beauty: “Something is not beautiful because we love it; rather, it is
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loved by us because it is beautiful and good.”100 Not surprisingly, then, the angelic doctor lists
three conditions of beauty: “integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are
by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or clarity, whence
things are called beautiful which have a bright colour.”101 Ultimately this means, as Balthasar
sees it, that “The light of the transcendentals, unity, truth, goodness and beauty, a light at one
with the light of philosophy, can only shine if it is undivided. A transcendence of beauty alone
is not viable.”102 On the other hand, and more positively, “the beautiful is implied in the order
of truth and goodness.”103 In fact, Aquinas maintains that “beauty and goodness in a thing are
identical fundamentally,” with this difference: “beauty relates to the cognitive faculty,”
whereas “goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire).”104
By classing the beautiful among the transcendentals, we mean that it has, as the name
implies, an intrinsically transcendent dimension, in virtue of which it draws (or literally
“trans-ports”) its beholder out of the immanence of this world. The manifestation of the
beautiful, like that of Being in its other transcendental properties (those of truth, goodness and
unity), “invites the creaturely spirit,” Balthasar explains, “to move away from and beyond
itself and [to] entrust and surrender itself to that mystery”105: that of beauty, in the case at
hand. In this sense, at least, the encounter between a great work of art and its beholder is
necessarily ecstatic: it causes one to stand (stasis) out (ex) of one’s own self. Art might thus
rightly be personified, for here the object (a work of art) acts as a subject: it exercises a sort of
bewitching, or enchanting influence upon the one who beholds it: like a charm, whence the
word charming. As such, it nonetheless testifies to the truth of an objective world, which is
open to the transcendental realm: to, that is to say, a dimension beyond the confines of the
subject and of his spiritual powers of imagination and projection.
It is not only this encounter between art and its beholder that is characterized by
ecstasy, however, for Balthasar argues that the artist himself – precisely in his greatest
moment of genius – is also so marked by it.
[I]n the phenomenon of inspiration there exists a moment which the heathen has
always sensed but which only the Christian can grasp with all the preciseness of faith. This is
the moment when one’s own inspiration mysteriously passes over into inspiration through the
100
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genius, the daimon, or the indwelling god, a moment when the “spirit that contains the god”
(en-thusiasmos) obeys a superior command which as such implies form and is able to impose
form.106
When, in other words, the artist acts by inspiration, he cannot be considered as simply
imposing upon a marble block a vision out of his self-consciousness or even out of his own
necessarily limited imagination: limited by what he has seen and experienced; for as
Ecclesiastics puts it all too well, “What has been will be again, what has been done will be
done again; there is nothing new under the sun” (1:9). In the moment of inspiration, in
contrast, there is something radically new that shines upon the horizon, something that
literally breaks into time and man’s perspective from outside of his time and perspective.
A similar phenomenon occurs when one is overtaken by love or beauty. Dante might
well have immortalized the lovely Beatrice, but only after her incredible beauty inspired him
to greatness, transporting him outside of himself:
And when this most gracious being actually bestowed the saving power of her
salutation, I do not say that Love as an intermediary could dim for me such unendurable bliss
but, almost by excess of sweetness, his influence was such that my body, which was then
utterly given over to his governance, often moved like a heavy, inanimate object. So it is plain
that in her greeting resided all my joy, which often exceeded and overflowed my capacity.107
VI. The Creative Power of Beauty and Love
In the above example of the transporting quality of beauty that awakens love there is
nothing of that falsified beauty that we call seduction: that manipulative effort to subject the
beholder to one’s own power, thereby reducing him to an object, much as feminists perceive
men to have done to women throughout the centuries. Instead of respectfully (indeed,
lovingly) receiving the other in view of forming an authentic communion of persons wherein
both are enriched in a way that sexual fruitfulness makes explicit in exemplary (though
certainly not exclusive!) manner, seduction allures the other in order to trap him, as it were,
for one’s own purpose or that of another: as in the use of women’s bodies to sell everything
from toothpaste to pornography. As such—as manipulative—seduction not only objectifies
the other, by inciting his base desires in view of a obtaining a certain end (or profit) from him,
it also objectifies one’s own self: at least as one is presented to the eyes of the other, namely
in the reductive sense of the body, as an outer shell, or “packaging.”
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From this perspective, eros is reduced to what we commonly refer today as the erotic.
In the profound words of Pope Benedict XVI, which almost echo the insights of his
predecessor:
Eros, reduced to pure “sex”, has become a commodity, a mere “thing” to be bought
and sold, or rather, man himself becomes a commodity. This is hardly man's great “yes” to the
body. On the contrary, he now considers his body and his sexuality as the purely material part
of himself, to be used and exploited at will. Nor does he see it as an arena for the exercise of
his freedom, but as a mere object that he attempts, as he pleases, to make both enjoyable and
harmless. Here we are actually dealing with a debasement of the human body: no longer is it
integrated into our overall existential freedom; no longer is it a vital expression of our whole
being, but it is more or less relegated to the purely biological sphere.108
As a case in point, C. S. Lewis points us to the terrible hero of George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-Four, who before sleeping with the heroine asks: “You like doing this? I
don’t mean simply me; I mean the thing in itself.”
The thing is a sensory pleasure; that is, an event occurring within one’s own body. We
use a most unfortunate idiom when we say, of a lustful man prowling the streets, that he
“wants a woman.” Strictly speaking, a woman is just what he does not want. He wants a piece
of apparatus. How much he cares about the woman as such may be gauged by his attitude to
her five minutes after fruition (one does not keep the carton after one has smoked the
cigarettes).109
Or, to put it in the words of blessed John Paul II, even the man who “looks” at a
woman in such a reductive way—as a body—“makes use” of her, of her femininity, “to
satisfy his own ‘instincts’.”110 In so doing, he simultaneously devalues or impoverishes an
“authentic value,” namely, “that dignity to which the integral value of her femininity
corresponds in the person in question.”111
“The sexual instinct,” writes Karol Wojtyla, “wants to take over, to make use of
another person, whereas love wants to give, to create a good, to bring happiness.”112 In the
first case—which we might qualify as a “love” of concupiscence—one cannot really be said
to suffer ecstasy, St. Thomas teaches. Because, to be more specific, he seeks to have a good
for himself, “he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement [of love or desire]
remains finally within him[self],” as differing from one who seeks the good of the beloved
“for his [or her own] sake.”113
The man, on the other hand, who is truly enraptured by a woman, in the classic sense
of eros—that of a transporting love in the classic (heightened) sense114—does not simply
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desire a pleasure that she might grant him. What he desires, rather, is the woman herself115:
not as a commodity to be possessed, of course, but as a person with whom he can more fully
or more completely express, develop, and realize his own humanity, including his proper
sexuality. Far from debasing both herself and the man as the seducer might be thought to do,
the beautiful woman—and truly every woman is beautiful, as is every flower—invites (again
simply in virtue of who she is) a regard from the man that might be understood as uplifting, or
ecstatic, in the positive sense of the term: as that which literally draws him out (ex-) of
himself toward that which is befitting, even ennobling, of his own humanity.116
If, moreover, she might be said to “do” this in virtue of who she is, as human and as
female, it is obviously toward her very self (her person) that he is drawn, but not—and this is
no minor point, for this is where we might also draw a fine line between seduction and love,
on the one hand, and between passion and love, on the other hand—as the be all and end all.
If, in fact, a person can never be possessed, the only proper end of the drawing attraction
toward a person is communion with him or her: a communion wherein each might
nevertheless more fully discover and realize the meaning of his or her own humanity and
sexuality.
For a human being is always first and foremost himself (“a person”), and in order not
merely to live with another but to live by and for that other person he must continually
discover himself in the other and the other in himself. Love is impossible for beings who are
mutually impenetrable—only the spirituality and the “inwardness”, of persons create the
conditions for mutual interpenetration, which enables each to live in and by the other [to
enter, that is to say, into the other’s interiority].117
This mutual indwelling of persons requires, of course, a willingness to freely open or
unveil oneself to the other, in what might be understood as an authentic gift of self: a gift in
virtue of which the other is granted entry within one’s own interiority, as it were.118 Precisely
316, emphasis his). Where the spiritual is thus contrasted to the sensual, we obviously have recourse to that
which specifies the human person as such: namely, the spiritual dimension.
115
“Without Eros sexual desire like every other desire is a fact about ourselves. Within Eros it is rather about the
Beloved” (C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves, 95). Similarly, Wojtyla expresses the “superiority of the value of the
person to that of sex” (Love and Responsibility, 197).
116
As St. Thomas very fittingly expresses it: “[N]othing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it;
rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is
hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently, love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and
worsens him.” (ST I-II, q. 28, a. 5: “Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso
laeditur, sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod vero coaptatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi
conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est perfectivus et meliorativus
amantis, amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis.”) Hence, as St.
Augustine would fittingly have it: “whether for good or evil, each man lives by his love” (Contra Faustum 5.10;
Migne, PL 42: 228: “quia ex amore suo quisque vivit, vel bene vel male.” Cited by Josef Pieper, “On Love,”
166).
117
Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 131.
118
The illusion here is more spiritual than sexual, although the one certainly need not exclude the other. Edith
Stein explains this phenomenon with profound insight: “I look in the eyes of an animal and from there,
something looks at me. I look into his interior, into his soul, which perceives (spürt) my regard and my presence.
But it is a mute and imprisoned soul: imprisoned in itself, unable to go back beyond itself and to grasp itself,
unable to go out of itself to come to me. I look into the eyes of a man and his regard (sein Blick) answers me. He
lets me penetrate in his interior or he repulses me. He is the master of his soul and can open or close its door. He
can step out of himself and enter into the thing. When two men regard one another, an ‘I’ stands before another
‘I’. There can be an encounter before their doors or an encounter in the interior. If there is an encounter in the
interior, then the other ‘I’ is a ‘you’” (Edith Stein, Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person. Vorlesung zur
philosophischen Anthropologie. Gesamtausgabe 14 [Freiburg im Breisgau / Basel / Wein: Herder, 2004], 78).

https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol4/iss1/2

22

Schumacher: Navigating Between Naturalism and Idealism in the Spirit of Veritatis Splendor

this unveiling of the self provides, moreover, the occasion whereby the person might not only
be revealed to the other, but also to him or her own self: by, that is to say, the loving regard
that this unveiling invites from the very one to whom he or she has entrusted the mystery of
his or her person (or interiority).
As Balthasar once again explains in his comparison of the artist and the lover:
A model […] disrobes before the artist in the expectation that the latter’s eye will look
on him as no one but the artist could behold him—as even the model himself, if he chanced to
catch a glimpse of himself in the mirror, could not see himself. […] This special gaze, which
is possible only in the loving attention of the subject, is equally objective and idealizing. That
these two qualities can be compatible is the grand hope of the object [who, in this case, is a
person, and thus also a subject]. It [the person who is the object of the other’s regard] hopes to
attain in the space of another the ideality that it [he or she] can never realize in itself [him- or
herself]. It [he or she] knows or guesses what it [he or she] could be, what splendid
possibilities are present in it [him or her]. But in order to develop these possibilities, it [he or
she] needs someone who believes in them—no, who sees them already existing in a hidden
state, where, however, they are visible only to one who firmly holds that they can be realized;
to one, in other words, who believes and loves. Many wait only for someone to love them in
order to become who they always could have been from the beginning. It may also be that the
lover, with his mysterious, creative gaze, is the first to discover in the beloved possibilities
completely unknown to their possessor, to whom they would have appeared incredible.119
This simultaneously objective and ideal (realist and transcendental: metaphysical)
regard of the beloved in the eyes of the lover is, Balthasar insists, “as much subjective as it is
objective. Its subjectivity does not consist in the fact that, say, it does not conform to the truth;
it is subjective because its truth attains to real, objective truth only through a subject, just as a
fruit can come to maturity only in a certain climate.”120 By this the Swiss theologian means,
more specifically, that the lover “conceives [erzeugt] an image” of the beloved which the
latter would not otherwise have necessarily accredited to him- or herself, and “when love is
genuine and faithful,” it gives the beloved the power to approach it in likeness. The beloved
“does not want to disappoint; he wants to show himself grateful that someone takes him so
seriously and expects so much of him [or her].”121
To be sure, the human lover does not create the good and the beauty within the
beloved;122 rather, he perceives, affirms and rejoices over it: over, that is to say, the beloved
119

Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic I, 114-15.
Ibid., 115.
121
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Convergences: To the Source of Christian Mystery (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1983), 128-29. I have taken the liberty to change the official translation from “produces an image” to “conceives
an image” which is more accurate not only linguistically but also philosophically and psychologically: it is a
mental image that is addressed here.
122
St. Thomas explains this with penetrating realism in the distinction that he draws between divine and human
love: “God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object [cf. ST I-II, q. 27, a. 1; q. 25, a. 2] our love, whereby we
will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary,
calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has
not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness” (ST I, q. 20, a.
2: “]M]anifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas
nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus,
non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei
120

Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2014

23

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2

him- or herself, who is manifest to the lover as good and beautiful. This perception accounts
for the objective dimension of the love: “We must have experienced and ‘seen’ that the other
person, as well as his existence in this world, really is good and wonderful; that is the
precondition for the impulse of the will that says, ‘It’s good that you exist!’”123 Or as
Balthasar would have it: “The image was only concealed in the beloved, and the eyes of love
had to come and raise it from the depths.”124 On the other hand, in the experience of sensual
beauty, we are not simply referred “to something that is “present and discernible.” Far from
arriving at some sort of satisfaction of our desire, the experience of beauty awakens one to
“expectation”: “We do not see or partake of a fulfilment,” Pieper explains, “but of a
promise.”125
What precisely is anticipated, Pieper suggests, is the lover’s union with the beloved.
The delightful cry of affirmation, “It’s good that you exist!” expresses the lover’s specific
desire to be one with the beloved. And, “This once again confirms, from another angle, that
love’s act of approval is not intended as mere verification; rather, it is an impulse of the will
that takes the person of the other as its partner and is involved in the other himself’.”126 Such
is thus also an invitation that the lover bestows upon the beloved. His is not only an objective
love; it is also an ideal one: a summoning, or encouraging, love; a love which Pieper
perceives as “a continuation and in a certain sense even a perfecting of what was begun in the
course of creation” when the divine Artist brought forth the universe by his Word (the Son)
and, by the same Word, affirmed that it was “very good” (Gen 1: 31).127
As for the beloved, who consciously experiences this simultaneously realist and
idealist love, Pieper imagines him responding in the words provided by Robert O. Johann: “I
need you in order to be myself. . . . In loving me you give me myself, you let me be’.”128
Certainly, this does not literally mean, as Dean Martin put it in his 1960 hit: “You’re nobody
‘till somebody loves you.” To assent to any such proposition would be to deny the objective
dimension of love: to the fact that it is not simply founded upon an idealized (even idolized)
image of the beloved, but upon the actual impressed image of the beloved in the mind’s “eye”
of the lover; for as Pieper would rightly have it, “there can be no true love without approving
contemplation.”129 Balthasar nonetheless suggests that the beloved knows that “the realization
of his best potentialities is, not his merit, but the creative work of love, which impelled him to
realize them, held before him the mirror and the ideal image, and bestowed the strength to
attain the goal.” Hence, and in short, “In this creative happening”—that of the dynamic
encounter of lover and beloved—every distinction between subjective and objective becomes
meaningless.”130 Within the parameters of love, it is true to affirm: “It is in the Thou […] that
we find our I.”131
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VII. Conclusion: Christ, the Divine Archetype and the Moral Norm
If the particular love of eros between man and woman is, as Pieper and Balthasar
suggest, paradigmatic of what the latter calls the “basic law” of human existence (namely that
it is in the “Thou” that we find our “I”), it is in the love of God revealed by Christ that this
“law” receives “its full truth.”132 By this affirmation Balthasar means more specifically that
“The archetype of every creature lies in God, and, because it is conceived and beheld by God,
this archetype contains and expresses the entire plenitude of the creature’s perfection (which
is possible only in God).”133 Hence, in the revelation of his glory in his incarnate Son, whom
Balthasar fittingly presents as the Creator’s “greatest work of art,”134 God might be thought of
as simultaneously affirming our natural goodness and beauty and encouraging their growth
and development. He who is “the image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15) in whom “all things
were created” (v. 16) is also “the first-born of all creation” (v. 15), the One who—John Paul II
reminds in Veritatis Splendor (as he so often did throughout his pontificate)—“fully discloses
man to himself and unfolds his noble calling by revealing the mystery of the Father and the
Father's love”.135
“The one who is Beauty itself,” writes Pope Benedict XVI, allowed himself “to be
slapped in the face, spat upon, crowned with thorns,” precisely so that in his “so disfigured”
face there might appear “genuine, extreme beauty: the beauty of love that goes ‘to the very
end’” (cf. Jn 13:1). “Whoever has perceived this beauty knows that truth, not falsehood, is the
real aspiration of the world.”136 Whoever, in other words, has perceived this “(literally) ‘transporting’ beauty,”137 knows not only the beauty of divine love, but also the beauty of his or her
own humanity: a humanity, whom God did not hesitate to assume for the purpose of likening
us unto himself in a manner that profoundly respects our freedom.
In the powerful words of John Paul II:
Christ, precisely as the crucified one, is the Word that does not pass away, and He is
the one who stands at the door and knocks at the heart of every man, without restricting his
freedom, but instead seeking to draw from this very freedom love, which is not only an act of
solidarity with the suffering Son of man, but also a kind of “mercy” shown by each one of us
to the Son of the eternal Father. In the whole of this messianic program of Christ, in the whole
revelation of mercy through the cross, could man’s dignity be more highly respected and
ennobled, for, in obtaining mercy, He is in a sense the one who at the same time “shows
mercy”?138
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Precisely in this revelation of the infinite love of God in the Cross of Calvary, the
human person thus comes to understand the profound mystery of his or her own desires: the
fact that we naturally long “for love more than for freedom.”139 These words published in
1960—nearly twenty years before John Paul II’s pontificate began in 1978—were echoed all
the louder in his first encyclical:
“Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for
himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he
does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it. This […]
is why Christ the Redeemer “fully reveals man to himself”. If we may use the expression, this
is the human dimension of the mystery of the Redemption. In this dimension man finds again
the greatness, dignity and value that belong to his humanity.”140
It is not simply the revelation of our humanity that is accomplished by the magnificent
gift of his death on the Cross, however; for Christ simultaneously elevates it (especially
human freedom) by entrusting us with his own Spirit, through whom “he gives the grace to
share his own life and love and provides the strength to bear witness to that love in personal
choices and actions (cf. Jn 13: 34-35).” In precisely this way, “He himself becomes,” as we
read in Veritatis Splendor, “a living and personal law, who invites people to follow him.” 141
Hence:
[Whoever] wishes to understand himself thoroughly—not just in accordance with
immediate, partial, often superficial and even illusory standards and measures of his being—
must with his unrest, uncertainty and even his weakness and sinfulness, with his life and
death, draw near to Christ. He must, so to speak, enter him with all his own self; he must
“appropriate” and assimilate the whole of the reality of the incarnation and redemption in
order to find himself.142
It is thus obvious for one who has discovered him- or herself in Christ and who lives
by his (Christ’s) Spirit, that the divine Artist does not so much act upon us, as within us (cf.
Gal 2:20): in, that is to say, a manner that profoundly respects our freedom. It is, after all, by
“performing morally good acts” that the Christian is said by John Paul II to “strengthen,
develop and consolidate” his or her “likeness to God.”143 He or she is therefore both “artist
and artifact.”144
From this perspective—that of Veritatis Splendor—there is no better way to bring
about a cultural appreciation for the beauty of the truth than to be enraptured by it.145 Love is
possessed only when it is given away, and beauty is seen only when one is surrendered to it. It
139
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is by living in accord with the truth of our own humanity (and thus also our sexuality), as it
might be discovered in the natural law and still more profoundly in Christian revelation, that
we will increasingly discover its meaning and lead others to do the same. For, while “the
splendour of truth shines forth in all the works of the Creator,” it shines “in a special way, in
man, created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26).”146 Discovering and
experiencing this splendour nonetheless requires that we take time to listen and contemplate
the Creator’s mind in his creation—including the creation of our very persons—and thus also
his intentions for our lives. This, in turn, means letting go of all that deafens our hearing and
obscures our sight from the perception of beauty and truth. This requires faith: a profound
trust in God’s goodness and his power. It also requires humility, because what is given does
not originate within us. We have claim to it only as having received it.147 Yes, this is pure and
simple gift, but gift calls to gift as “deep calls to deep” (Ps 42:7). And if we are not to be
slaves to our own freedom, we must, as John Paul II so aptly expressed it, be “free with the
very freedom of the gift.”148
In the final analysis, the woman of faith will discover herself neither in a heavy block
of stone (an image of naturalism in the reduced “form” of physicalism), nor in modern man
who—as the history of modern feminism would have it—risks reducing her to a projection of
either himself or of his interests upon her (as in the Sartrian brand of existentialism), far less
still in her isolated self (modern idealism). Rather, it is in the affectionate regard of the lover,
who keenly perceives her natural beauty and goodness and simultaneously encourages her to
become who she is—the beloved (indeed, the chosen) one who is invited by his love to love
in return149—that she will most fully discover the mystery of her own humanity and thus also
of her sexuality. Precisely this realist vision—which Balthasar suggests is as much
transcendent as it is objective—is a paradigm of the love of God in Christ Jesus: the divine
Archetype in whom we were chosen “before the foundation of the world, that we should be
holy and blameless before him” (Eph 1: 4). If, however, we have perceived, in his loving
regard, the affirmation of our natural goodness and beauty and have heeded his call to live
accordingly, this is because we have been enraptured and transported by “the light of God’s
face shin[ing] in all its beauty on the countenance of Jesus Christ.”150
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